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Introduction 
 
 
On December 31st, 2019, the World Health Organisation received a report from the Chinese 
government detailing a cluster of cases of ‘pneumonia of unknown origin’, later identified as 
novel coronavirus. The virus, now referred to as COVID-19, quickly spread and was officially 
declared a global pandemic on March 11th.   
 
COVID-19 has put health services under enormous strain globally. Turning to digital methods 
for collating data on cases, associated symptoms and the routes through which the virus may 
be spreading has been a common response.   
 
Human-powered contact tracing, although resource-intensive, is still considered to be the 
most effective way of tracking and helping to curtail the spread of infectious diseasesi.  Intense 
efforts are underway to develop digital tools that can augment and automate some of these 
processes, such as the NHSX app or Singapore’s TraceTogether app, however, these are 
often beset with technical and privacy-related issues.  
 
This report reviews digital approaches that involve citizens as co-actors in efforts to support 
contact tracing, which may include elements of both location/proximity monitoring and 
symptom reporting, the latter representing a type of crowdsourced disease surveillance.ii  This 
is approached from the perspectives of public health data needs, privacy-centred 
architectures, technologies and standards, and digital ethics.  
 
The aim is to inform an approach to digital contact tracing that is consistent with Scottish policy 
around secure, transparent, participatory and privacy-respectful data sharing for health and 
wellbeing. As such, some of the insights and recommendations are applicable to broader 
aspects of digital health in Scotland.  
 
 
The report collates expert answers to the following questions: 
 
 What are the desirable outcomes arising from the automation of symptom and contact 
tracing data collection at scale? (Prof Jill Pell, Institute of Health and Wellbeing, 
University of Glasgow); 
 How might the distributed system be architected to be secure and respectful of privacy 
from the outset? (Prof Bill Buchanan, OBE, School of Computing, Edinburgh  Napier 
University); 
 What communications standards and methods would best support the approach? (Prof 
Muhammad Imran, James Watt School of Engineering, University of Glasgow); 
 What are the ethical challenges and what steps should Scottish Government take to 
secure public trust? (Prof Claudia Pagliari, Usher Institute, University of Edinburgh) 
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What are the desirable outcomes arising from the automation of 
symptom and contact tracing data collection at scale?  
(Jill Pell, Institute of Health and Wellbeing, University of Glasgow) 
 
From a health system perspective, desirable outcomes of digital COVID-19 apps fall into 
three main categories: Public Health (enabling case finding and contact tracing), Clinical and 
Self-management (informing risk predictions and interventions), and Service Planning 
(estimating prevalence and patterns to aid planning and policy). 
   
Public Health 
  
Case finding, contract tracing and isolation are now widely agreed to be central to reducing 
the transmission of infectious diseases. Countries that had sufficient testing capacity to 
implement this strategy at the outset of COVID-19, such as South Koreaiii, have experienced 
fewer cases and fewer deaths.  UK and Scottish testing capacity have increased greatly since 
the onset of the pandemic, with thousands of additional tracers having recently been recruited, 
which will be vital to support any lifting current restrictions (i.e. exiting lock-down). 
  
Currently, many symptomatic people are self-managing without presenting to the NHS and 
many people who may have been infected will not be aware of this. An app that can be used 
by members of the public may prove valuable for identifying possible/probable community-
based cases currently unknown to the NHS. It could also be used to provide these people with 
immediate advice on social distancing prior to receiving a test result, provide more rapid 
communication of positive test results, help with identifying the contacts of confirmed cases, 
and facilitate their testing and advice. 
  
The potential benefits therefore include reduced community transmission and prevention of a 
resurgence of cases and deaths when current restrictions are lifted. 
  
Clinical and self-management  
  
Identification of the risk factors associated with having a poor outcome following COVID-19 
infection has been highlighted as a priority for COVID-19 researchiv, because it can support 
better decisions about when and how to intervene.  A recent systematic review found no risk 
prediction models for COVID-19 assessment outside of hospitals.v Hospitalised patients are a 
highly selected sub-group of patients and risk models developed in these patients may not be 
generalisable to patients in the community. Information collected using an app could help to 
develop these community-based risk models. 
  
A suitable app would give people who have tested positive a means to report others they have 
recently been nearby, so the NHS can contact those people by telephone with advice to self-
isolate. Contacts can also use such an app to monitor their own symptoms and seek support 
if these escalate. Some apps also seek consent from users to link the symptom information 
they provide to their other health records, including not only test results but also information 
on hospitalisation, admission to ICU, ventilation, length of hospital stay and death. The data 
obtained could then be used in research to develop community-based risk models, which 
could be built into the app to provide patients who are self-managing with more appropriate 
recommendations on when to seek advice, assessment and testing. The same information 
could be used by community-based healthcare staff to inform their triage decisions.  
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The benefits therefore include the development of evidence-based risk prediction tools that 
improve self-management and clinical decision making; improving patient outcomes whilst 
reducing the risk of overburdening health services through avoidable referrals. 
  
Service planning 
  
There is currently a lack of UK data on the true incidence of COVID-19. Many cases currently 
do not present to the NHS and are not tested. Attempts have been made to infer population 
incidence from prevalence data, or incidence among the sub-group of patients who are tested, 
or from our understanding of other viral respiratory infections. Wide-scale use of an app that 
records the start date of symptoms, rapid testing of index cases and collection of symptoms 
among contacts would provide much better information on, and tracking of, population 
incidence. This in turn would inform our understanding of: 
 
 When and where to enhance or lift restrictions; 
 The testing capacity required to implement case finding and contact tracing; 
 Testing strategies; and 
 The location of testing facilities. 
  
Given the current situation of incomplete case ascertainment and highly selected data 
collection, the classification of a “very high risk” sub-group of the population in need of 
shielding has been based on expert opinion informed by previous viruses and limited 
information on COVID-19 collected in other countries.  
 
Collection of standardised data on a more complete and representative sample of cases would 
enable us to produce more evidence-based definitions of those groups in needs of enhance 
shielding when current restrictions are lifted. 
 
How might the distributed system be architected to be secure and 
respectful of privacy from the outset?  
(Bill Buchanan, School of Computing, Edinburgh Napier University) 
 
There are two main options available for automating contact-tracing: one where identities are 
unknown (e.g. strangers co-located on public transport) or one which present unacceptable 
privacy barriers (e.g. precise location monitoring is unacceptable in the UK). Both are based 
on the exchange of anonymous, temporary ‘Bluetooth handshakes’ between mobile phones. 
The ‘decentralised’ model favoured by Google/Apple keeps all data on the phone, which apps 
can only access via a secure API with the user’s agreement. In contrast, the NHSX App 
requires direct Bluetooth access and holds a copy of users’ cryptographic ‘identity’ on an NHS 
database, so that this can be linked with other services or information for supporting human 
contact tracing, analytics or research.   
 
The NHSX App allows the health service to perform matches and follow-up on contacts but 
suffers from many technical problems related to it being a stand-alone application. The 
installation of the App from an App store will be a significant barrier, along with the complexity 
of setting up the rights to monitor contacts. The Google/Apple API has strong privacy settings, 
but will not allow the NHS to follow-up on contacts, unless consent is built in. 
 
Some significant points are: 
 
1. Decentralised tracing: The Google/Apple contact tracing method has strong privacy 
protections built in: the data collected is stored locally on the app user’s device, and 
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user’s consent is required for the release of infection data. On infection, a diagnosis 
key is sent to the NHS and this is held within a public repository. Everyone with the 
App can then determine if they are, and were, in contact with someone who is infected, 
but only for one day at a time. While secure for the user of the app, this approach has 
the disadvantage over the centralised approach, such as used by the NHSX app, in 
that the public health authority will not be able to use this data for contact tracing.  
 
2. Centralised tracing: With the NHSX App, users register and are assigned a unique 
ID on a central server (InstallationID). The NHS can then track the identity of people 
involved in a contact while using the app. Overall consent is added through the 
installation of the App. There are a number of security concerns around the NHSX 
App:  
a. Storage of the identifiers and the length of time that data gathered around the 
identifiers will be used on a centralised server.  
b. Concerns over the potential leak of the private key of the NHS, and which could 
possibly reveal all of the contacts. This is because public key encryption is used 
in the NHSX App, and where the public key is sent to the App, and which is 
then used to protect the identity as it is passed back to the central server. A 
breach of the associated private key would allow anyone to decrypt the identity 
passed back. 
c. Concerns that the data will not be sent directly to the NHS, but would be 
gathered by a third-party organisation, and stored within the public cloud. 
3. Local tracking: The Google/Apple API uses a rolling identifier that allows a user to be 
traced locally for only 10 minutes at a time, whereas the NHSX App uses a daily public 
key which can be resolved back to the user. There are thus concerns that a citizen 
could be tracked locally for one day with the NHSX App, as their associated daily public 
key is exposed for that time. 
4. Bluetooth stack: With the NHSX App, a significant worry is that it has its own 
Bluetooth stack, and which is not embedded into the operating system of the phone. 
This could pose security risks for fake apps and in the power drain of the device. If the 
drain is too large, users may end-up turning off their Bluetooth, or even uninstalling the 
App. As the UK needs at least 60% of the population to install the App for it to be an 
effective means of contact tracing, this may have a significant impact on the trust levels 
on the NHSX App.  
5. Consent for tracing: With the Google/Apple API, the contact tracing integration is 
embedded into the operating system of the phone, and thus has high trust levels, and 
where a user simply flips a consent switch (Figure 1). For the NHSX App, the App itself 
must gain the required rights to have full access to the Bluetooth stack, which may 
require a more complex setup for giving consent. 
6. Length of time for the contact logs to be stored: 
a) The Google/Apple API stores the contact logs for two weeks and then deletes 
these for each of the contacts.  
b) As the NHSX App is a stand-alone application storing the data centrally, it can 
set its own time limits on the time it keeps the contact logs, and the logs which 
are uploaded to the HA (Health Authority). Contact tracing logs may be kept up 
to 28 days on the NHS servers. There are questions around the auditing of this 
information. 
7. Data stored in the public cloud for NHSX App. It is reported that the data gathered 
from the NHSX App is being stored in a public cloud run by a private company (Box 
1). 
 
Recommendation: The best solution may be to use the Google/Apple API, with consent in 
the sharing process, but NHSX is the best for workflow (being able to map the steps and 
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consents). In Scotland, if the NHSX App is to be used, the data should be stored by NHS 
Scotland data infrastructure, and not by an external partner. 
 
 
 
Box 1: Text from NHSX Technical Specification  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Google/Apple consent for tracing  
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What communications standards and methods would best support 
the approach? What initiatives or options are already progressing that 
may help us get further faster?  
(Muhammad Imran, James Watt School of Engineering, University of Glasgow) 
 
Even with the government hiring thousands of new contact tracers, manual methods may be 
insufficient if infections surge. This is when apps may help to bridge the gap. Table 1 is a list 
of named apps that are being used in different countries, some of which are explicitly designed 
to aid contact tracing and others which support other forms of data collection for public health 
surveillance. 
 
TABLE 1 COVID-19 APPS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
Country Name of App Enabling Technology or Method  
Global Apple/Google API  Bluetooth 
The UK  C-19 COVID Symptom Tracker Self-reporting questionnaire 
NHSX Bluetooth 
Babylon COVID-19 Care Assistant AI, live chat with human agent, ChatBOT 
The EU  Pan-European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing 
Initiative 
Open source Bluetooth based sharing 
platform  
8 countries  DP-3T Bluetooth  
France  Covidom Digital online questionnaire  
Poland  Home Quarantine Instagram’s geolocation and facial 
recognition 
Germany Corona Data Donation Wearables 
Russia Russian Social Monitoring Hybrid (GPS, network, Bluetooth, 
camera) 
China Health Code GPS, Financial transactions, Mobile 
network 
South 
Korea 
Corona 100m GPS 
Safety Protection GPS 
Singapore TraceTogether Bluetooth 
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India AarogyaSetu GPS, Bluetooth 
COVID-19 Quarantine Monitor Tamil Nadu GPS 
The USA Safe Paths Bluetooth 
How We Feel Online questionnaire 
Private Automatic Contact Tracing Bluetooth 
Iran contact tracing App GPS 
Israel Hamagen GPS 
Australia COVIDSafe Bluetooth 
 
Understanding patterns of proximity is central to any contact tracing approach, including those 
involving apps.  A number of different methods are available to make this possible. 
Universal usage of mobile devices, smartphones and internet, GPS, Bluetooth beacons, WiFi, 
RFID, Telcom Cell Towers, wearable devices, crowdsourcing of social media and tracking of 
financial transactions can all potentially be used to track a COVID-19 patient’s location and 
that of other people they may have come into contact with.vi  
GPS, WiFi routers and cell towers provide absolute location data in the form of geolocation 
coordinates while Bluetooth pairing gives relative location data in the form of some reference 
description of the location, for example, that both persons shared the same bus.   
The GPS receiver can compute its position in terms of latitude, longitude, height and timing 
offset between the receiver and the satellites based on the signals from four GPS satellites. 
On contrary, contact tracing leveraging Bluetooth passively collects information about 
surrounding Bluetooth IDs by doing regular scans. The phone then stores the list of Bluetooth 
devices it has encountered (Figure 1). 
 
(a)                                         (b)                                         
Figure 1: Contact tracing using GPS and Bluetooth. 
Ubiquity of WiFi access through massive deployment of WiFi routers can be exploited to gain 
the knowledge of a user’s mobility data. Using Received Signal Strength Indication, MAC 
address, personal information and timestamps for the probe request of a user, the router can 
easily generate a WiFi signal map detecting the location of the user and duration of his 
presence based on the services used (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Contact tracing using Wifi. 
 
The Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) reader generates a query signal towards the 
RFID tags and the tag replies back with data. UHF RFID uses passive tags attached to 
smartphones and objects. It enables location tracking of the COVID-19 patient, as well as 
items touched/used by them (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Contact tracing through RFID. 
 
5G networks use large antenna arrays and ultra-wide bandwidths (UWB). They enable a 
decimeter level accuracy in location systems. Mobile network information and radio control 
signals can also be used to get a subscriber’s location and mobility history, as shown in Figure 
4 a.  
Social media analytics can be expanded by fusing together additional data sources, such as 
License Plate Recognition, smart city CCTV, ATM transactions and credit card purchases. 
Graph theory leveraging “small-world network” approach along with mobile network data/WiFi 
can enable to detect geolocation and contact people information of an individual (Figure 4b). 
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  (a)                                              (b) 
Figure 4: Contact tracing using mobile network and social media. 
                    
Wearable devices make use of a number of technologies including cellular, Near Field 
Communication (NFC), Bluetooth, WiFi, GPS, Ultra-wideband (UWB), Long Term Evolution 
(LTE) and 5G for information gathering, communication and localisation. A typical wearable 
device can perform the contact tracing feature for COVID-19 by tracking the location of the 
user through GPS tracker as well as proximity sensors utilising Bluetooth, UWB radio and 
LTE/5G connectivity (Figure 5). 
Artificial Intelligence based technologies such as facial recognition can also be employed 
to identify individuals or reduce the number of false positives, although limited availability 
restricts their usage.   
 
 
Figure 5: Contact tracing via wearables. 
 
Table 2 summarises the discussed contact tracing enablers along with their advantages 
and disadvantages. The Bluetooth approach, being pursued at various stages by governments 
across Europe and Latin America, as well as in Australia and Asia, has emerged as the most 
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suitable method for contact tracing in the backdrop of COVID-19. However, it has its own 
deficiencies that limit its capabilities. It requires a majority of people in a geographic area to 
adopt it for it to be effective. These apps are also considered to be interfering with vital signs 
monitoring applications, such as diabetes monitoring. Some countries, including South Korea 
and Israel, are using high-tech methods of contact tracing that involve tracking peoples’ 
location via phone networks. However, such centralized, surveillance-based approaches are 
viewed as invasive and unacceptable in many countries for privacy reasons. The Bluetooth-
based apps are also more privacy-friendly than tracking techniques that use GPS or mobile 
phone data. They use Bluetooth to broadcast and receive an encrypted, pseudonymous signal 
from nearby phones and create a log of interactions that remain on the phone, so users’ names 
and numbers are not disclosed.  
WiFi is widely available and can be used without any investment in the infrastructure. 
However, it suffers from low accuracy as its range is 80-100m. Hybrid techniques such as 
using the built-in accelerometer and gyroscope with WiFi can improve accuracy. Social Media 
approach also has good potential but is marred by authentication restrictions. Wearables 
appear to be a dynamic and effective solution as they have the capability to make use of 
multiple technologies with improved efficiency and higher accuracy. 
Contact tracing solutions do not have a uniform system architecture. Whilst countries rush to 
deploy contact tracing apps, they raise a multitude of issues including privacy, data protection, 
security loopholes, lack of testing and part use of the smartphones. The privacy concerns 
need to be eradicated through GDPR compliance, transparent development of the app and 
data usage and reassurance about the temporary nature of the surveillance. In the light of this 
discussion, we can make the following recommendations: 
 Use of RFID and other technologies for tracing in safe workplaces. 
 Use of smartphone’s built-in sensors (for example gyroscope and magnetometer) to 
correlate similar locations without revealing the actual coordinates. 
 Optimised use of general Bluetooth technology with a control on range for improving 
the detection accuracy or combining this with other presented enabling technologies 
to improve the accuracy and maintain the enhanced privacy. 
 Multilayer hierarchy to provide options to end-users to control the comfort level of what 
is acceptable for them to consent to (lowest layer RFID in workplace only, Bluetooth 
on users control, Bluetooth pushed by the App with no control, Bluetooth + GPS + 
RFID). 
TABLE 2 COMPARISON OF COVID-19 CONTACT ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES 
Technology Pros Cons 
GPS  Locating infected users in 
real-time.  
 Identify virus hotspots with 
Geo-data.  
 Local information and 
awareness for patients, 
carers. 
 Enables geo-fencing through 
user monitoring.  
 High power, storage and 
computational requirements.  
 Low accuracy in urban and 
indoor.  
 Social fears of being tracked 
and lack of trust in the use of 
personal/health data.  
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Bluetooth   Wide availability. 
 Low power, storage and 
computational requirements. 
 List of all devices that have 
“made contact” is readily 
available.  
 Inaccuracy of proximity 
approximation as 5-10m 
scanning range raises false 
positives. 
 No real-time location 
information.  
 Higher programming 
requirements to ensure 
Bluetooth connectivity and 
response to App.  
Bluetooth + UHF 
RFID 
 Higher accuracy with double 
check. 
 Can track the belongings and 
items in use of the patient. 
  Higher cost of tagging items and 
deploying RFID readers with 
RSSI and phase. 
WiFi router tracing  Widely available. 
 Wide range of different types 
of existing WiFi routers can 
be used with no extra 
hardware. 
  Relatively low accuracy.  
Mobile network 
tracing 
 No App installation is 
required. 
 Transparent to the user. 
 Larger public access, who, if 
desired, could opt-out of the 
programme. 
  List of devices that have made 
contact is not available. 
  Only high-level localisation 
information is available. 
  Participation of network 
operators is required to 
increase coverage. 
UWB 5G   High accuracy   Not yet fully operational 
Social media  A pre-outbreak pattern can be 
identified predicting the next 
affected areas. 
 Could generate near-real-
time information. 
  Location and financial 
transactions information give 
rise to privacy issues. 
Wearable devices 
using Bluetooth/ 
GPS/ WiFi 
 Suitable for high traffic and 
dense areas including 
indoors, malls, homes. 
 Enables tracking & 
geofencing. 
 Increased coverage and 
reliability. 
 Cost effective.  
  Requires a customized wearable 
device. 
  App has to run at all times. 
  Can generate false positives as 
range is higher than 1.5m. 
  
 
  
 
 
15 
What are the ethical issues and what steps should Scottish 
Government take to secure public trust?  
(Claudia Pagliari, Usher Institute, University of Edinburgh) 
 
Trust and ethics  
 
Ensuring the health, safety and security of Scotland’s people is critical as we face this global 
pandemic, yet doing so must not come at an unacceptable cost to their privacy or civil liberties.    
 
While governments in countries such as China, South Korea and India have adopted a range 
of privacy-invasive and coercive approaches in their efforts to control the spread of COVID-
19, many of these are unacceptable in Western democracies, where the desire for freedom 
from government surveillance and interference is strongly felt.  In the case of contact tracing 
apps, this can be seen in the decisions of several European countries to move from centralised 
to decentralised approaches as a result of public unease, including Ireland and Germanyvii. 
 
Debates surrounding the ethics of COVID-19 apps have chiefly concerned the extent to which 
they provide anonymity for individuals, security for their personal information, and protection 
for their rights as members of a fair and lawful society.  Critical questions also relate to the 
control different actors hold over these technologies and the data they yield, which may 
potentially include not only public health authorities, but also other governmental agencies, 
third sector bodies, technology companies and others. The public’s acceptance of passive 
digital health surveillance tools, such as thermal imaging cameras, their willingness to actively 
install and use mobile apps for proximity tracking or symptom reporting, and their comfort with 
different levels of data sharing, are influenced at least as much by their trust in these actors 
as in the technologies themselves.   
 
These ethical issues can be further broken down into the entities requiring trust and the 
questions these provoke: 
 
 
 
Transparency and Accountability 
 
Key Dimensions of Trust and Ethics in Digital Contact Tracing Apps 
 
The technology - Will it work reliably, is it safe, is it secure? 
Its privacy policies -  Does it use only the minimum necessary data, is consent required, 
how anonymous is it, will data be deleted after COVID-19? 
Its usefulness – Is it needed for this purpose, does it achieve what it claims to, is the 
value worth the privacy trade?  
The people developing it - Are they being transparent about the project’s ambitions and 
scope, do they have secondary motives? 
The institutions responsible for delivering it - Is there sufficient oversight and 
accountability; are there adequate processes and expectations for stakeholder 
involvement? 
Its effects on citizens’ autonomy and rights - Are people free to choose whether or not 
to use it, could it restrict their liberty or lead to discrimination?    
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Aside from the important issues of privacy/anonymity and protection from harm, coercion or 
discrimination, transparency and accountability are central prerequisites for ethical digital 
health.  
 
Secretive and centralised decision-making by small groups can backfire, partly because it 
risks mistakes in design or functionality that could have been avoided with more experience 
at the table. For example, earlier release of the NHSX app’s software code could have 
prevented embarrassing security glitches that later came to light.viii It can also leave observers 
in a state of uncertainty about the solutions being developed; leading to misunderstanding and 
speculation which may be reputationally damaging or disruptive.      
 
Ethical concerns about “mission creep” have also been expressed. This concerns the 
possibility that technologies and data flows implemented for managing the pandemic may be 
re-used for other governmental purposes, such as policing, profiling or designing ‘nudge’ 
techniques, as well as for unspecified academic research or commercial innovation. During 
COVID-19 such concerns have been exacerbated by the participation of private-sector data-
mining companies in the NHS response effort. Accusations of mission creep were levelled at 
NHSX, after plans were revealed to include an optional symptom reporting feature in its 
contact tracing app and harvest the data for future research.ix 
 
As the above example shows, feelings can run high when digital initiatives are perceived as 
over-reaching their data needs and transparent, consistent public messaging is essential. 
Available information about the app proposed for the NHS in Scotland emphasises restricted 
use for official contact tracing and a privacy-respecting architecture that excludes proximity 
tracking, offering some reassurance for citizens worried about mass surveillance.x In parallel, 
however, medical researchers in Scotland have been encouraging citizens to download the 
semi-commercial Zoe app, which shares detailed personal data on symptoms, location, 
demographics and test results with the SAIL databank, where it can be linked with other data 
and accessed for research via the HDRUK Innovation Gateway.xi Nearly 3 million people 
across the UK have downloaded this app, which is now co-sponsored by the UK government 
and whose app store listing refers to the NHS, creating room for confusion. Given their very 
different implications for personal data, it will be important to establish how easily citizens can 
tell the difference between these ‘NHS’ apps.  
 
Public engagement and involvement 
 
Understanding citizens’ needs and tolerances is also essential for digital projects and 
programmes. While previous research on public attitudes to digital health and big data is a 
useful guide, and there is a long literature on human behaviour during disease outbreaks, 
there is relatively evidence at the intersection between these two, and very little in the context 
of COVID-19 apps.  
 
Various methods of public engagement exist, some more geared towards to informing citizens 
of new services, policies, risks or technologies, others towards understanding their needs, 
attitudes and concerns, and others aimed at involving them in decision-making or policy 
shaping.  Challenges during a fast-moving outbreak are that some of these methods are time 
consuming or typically require physical meetings, although adaptations are possible, such as 
online surveys, telephone interviews, social media listening or remote 
dialogues/deliberations.xii , xiii 
 
Just as a lack of access to technology, or digital exclusionxiv, affects some people’s ability 
to benefit from online services and apps during a pandemic, it also affects the way in which 
they can be informed, consulted, engaged, or involved in decision making. This is doubly 
problematic, since these are often the same elderly or vulnerable groups most at risk from 
COVID-19 and in need of support. Analogue methods, such as telephone surveys, radio or 
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television phone-ins, and paper-based questionnaires, are all possible ways to gather these 
citizens' views. In the present circumstances, however, engaging with community leaders and 
support groups as intermediaries may be more useful and effective.  
 
Citizens’ trust in digital contact tracing apps, and their willingness to use them also depends 
on how useful and necessary they believe them to be, which is likely to vary depending on 
the stage of the pandemic and the policies surrounding it (e.g. new outbreak, rapidly escalating 
deadly epidemic, lockdown, declining incidence and return to school/work). If the effort 
required to use an app, or the breadth of personal data it collects is seen as disproportionate 
to the stated need, then citizens will be far less inclined to use it.   
 
Lessons from similar countries to Scotland 
 
It is important to recognise that even when the requirements for ethical use are largely satisfied 
app usage cannot be guaranteed.  Singapore - a democratic country with a population roughly 
the size of Scotland’s - enjoys high levels of public trust in government, high compliance with 
laws, high levels of digital inclusion and its COVID-19 app ‘TraceTogether’ uses the 
decentralised Bluetooth proximity tracking model favoured by privacy professionals. Despite 
all of these factors, less than a quarter of the population has downloaded the app, due partly 
to privacy concerns but largely because the current version depletes mobile phone battery life. 
Apple’s latest operating system update should address the latter problem, but it remains to be 
seen whether rates of uptake increase, particularly while the outbreak is largely confined to 
already-quarantined migrant workers, thus limiting its usefulness.xv   
 
New Zealand’s successful containment of COVID-19 has been partly attributed to public 
compliance with social distancing, enabled by high levels of trust in government. The country 
recently implemented a privacy-preserving approach involving optional QSR code scanning, 
rather than location or proximity tracking. However, concerns over proposals to integrate 
Bluetooth tracking and about the app’s usefulness, mean that its future is uncertain.xvi 
 
As these examples show, public trust in and acceptance of digital technologies like COVID-
19 apps is dynamic and dependent on multiple factors. Engaging regularly and openly with 
citizens will be essential for understanding what is regarded as appropriate, necessary and 
proportionate under changing circumstances of risk and in different communities. Care should 
be taken to avoid mission creep or scenarios that unfairly benefit certain stakeholders, which 
could prompt accusations of ‘data opportunism’.xvii Importantly, consideration needs to be 
given to the necessity and likely benefits of any app, given the potential for wasted 
resourcesxviii, since sustaining health and care services is also an ethical priority.  
 
Discussion 
 
The Scottish Government is having to make rapid and important decisions about how to 
respond digitally to COVID-19. These require carefully balancing respect for citizens’ privacy  
with a desire to use technology and data to support disease surveillance, health service 
delivery, national statistics, research and innovation. Amongst these, apps that involve citizens 
as partners in contact-tracing efforts represent an immediate priority and one that has inspired 
both rapid global innovation and considerable debate.  
 
This article illustrates how different perspectives influence the ways in which different 
communities of practice are approaching this challenge, with the computer scientist focusing 
on the privacy propositions offered by different proximity tracking models, the engineer 
analysing technologies and communication standards associated with contact tracing 
initiatives, the public health expert emphasising the benefits of capturing citizens’ contacts and 
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symptom data for operational, analytical and clinical purposes, and the social scientist 
describing the ethical issues affecting the likely acceptance and uptake of these tools. 
 
As these summaries show, there is no one ‘perfect’ solution for digital contact tracing and 
debate around their relative merits and risks is likely to continue.   
 
What is clear is that, for Scotland to embrace its aspirations as an ‘ethical digital nation1’, 
further work is needed to find the optimum balance of privacy-respecting, secure, useful, 
inclusive and ethically acceptable innovations. This recognises the World Health 
Organisation’s definition of health as a state of physical, mental and social wellbeing, not 
merely the absence of disease, including the protection of fundamental rights, social equality, 
an informed and participative public, and responsible governance. 
 
Given the urgent needs presented by the current crisis, we recommend greater transparency 
and public engagement as well as further work to unpick the privacy, value and ethical 
challenges of alternative models. This needs to take account of both international experiences 
with these approaches, the changing risk context of COVID-19, and the unique needs of 
Scotland’s health service, culture and communities. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
 
Authors’ caveat:  At the time of writing (last update June 1st, 2020) only a sparse 
schematic for a digital contact tracing solution had been published by Scottish Government 
(drafted by DHI), which appears on the final page of the Test, Trace, Isolate, Support 
strategy document released on May 4th. The authors’ contributions are therefore largely 
based on what is known about approaches elsewhere and on expert considerations of the 
optimal scenarios for public health, technology privacy/ security, and digital ethics.  
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